In the previous installments of this series, we examined the background of Rep. Laurel Libby’s censure, her legal claims under state and federal law, and the broader implications of this case for her constituents and voters. Now, we turn to a crucial question: what exactly do Rep. Libby and her co-plaintiffs hope to achieve through their lawsuit? This part will explore the relief sought from the court, including injunctions, declaratory judgments, attorney’s fees, and other potential remedies, along with an analysis of the likelihood of each being granted.
Injunctions: Halting Laurel Libby’s Censure
One of the primary forms of relief sought by the plaintiffs is an injunction to halt the enforcement of Rep. Libby’s censure. An injunction is essentially the plaintiff asking the court to use the force of law to force someone to do some specific action. Specifically, the lawsuit aims to:
- Immediately restore her right to speak on the floor of the Maine House of Representatives without being required to issue a forced apology.
- Immediately restore her right to voting in the Maine House of Representatives without being required to issue a forced apology.
Likelihood of Being Granted
Injunctions are typically granted when the court finds that the plaintiff is likely to succeed on the case’s merits, and irreparable harm will occur if the injunction is not issued. Rep. Libby’s lawsuit raises serious constitutional concerns—particularly regarding the First Amendment, due process, and equal protection. A strong legal basis exists for an injunction.
Even if it is a temporary or limited restriction of her and her voters’ constitutional rights, the Supreme Court has previously ruled even temporary deprivations of constitutional rights constitute irreparable harm. In Elrod v. Burns (1976), the court held that temporary deprivations of First Amendment rights required an injunction. In a similar case to this, City of Phoenix v. Kolodziejski (1970), the Supreme Court unanimously affirmed injunctive relief for non-property-owning voters’ equal protection voting rights.
Courts have historically been wary of legislative bodies taking punitive actions against elected officials or the public in ways that restrict core democratic processes. This increases the likelihood that at least some injunctive relief will be considered.
Declaratory Judgment: Clarifying Constitutional Rights
In addition to injunctive relief, the plaintiffs are asking the court for declaratory judgment. Unlike injunctions, which ask the court to force someone to do something, this simply asks the court to “declare” an official statement on whether the behavior was illegal. In particular, the plaintiffs ask the Court to make the following declarations:
- Declare that the censure and its restriction of her speech and due process rights are unlawful retaliation against her, violating the First and Fourteenth Amendments of the U.S. Constitution.
- Declare that the censure of Rep. Libby prohibiting her from voting on her constituents’ behalf violates the equal protection clause, due process clause, and guarantee clause of the U.S. Constitution.
Likelihood of Being Granted
Declaratory relief is often granted in cases where the law is ambiguous or a government entity’s actions are challenged as unconstitutional. This requested repair is important because it establishes the rights of the individual legislator and her constituents for future cases. The court may be inclined to issue a declaratory judgment to set a precedent regarding the limits of disciplinary powers against lawmakers.
On one hand, this may not be granted, as the Supreme Court ruled in Houston Community College System v. Wilson (2022) that a school board member was not entitled to declaratory judgment when his fellow board members censured him. However, this can be distinguished by the fact that, like almost every other legislative body, the Houston Community College board’s censure was simply a formal condemnation of a member. It did not prohibit them from speaking or voting.
The Supreme Court noted the censure was not a First Amendment violation specifically because the censure in that case did not restrict the individual member’s speech. Thus, the plaintiff was not entitled to declaratory judgment. However, this case implies they would rule the other way if the censure did have a significant burden on the legislator’s First Amendment rights, which the Rep. Libby censure does. Thus, while there have been cases before where courts have limited declaratory judgment for legislative censures, they always addressed censures that didn’t restrict speech rights.
Attorney’s Fees and Other Damages
The lawsuit also seeks to recover attorney’s fees and other related costs incurred by Rep. Libby and her co-plaintiffs in pursuing their legal claims. Under 42 U.S.C. § 1988, prevailing plaintiffs in many civil rights cases are often entitled to attorney’s fees. The statute specifically references 42 U.S. Code § 1983, which specifically includes civil actions for deprivation of constitutional rights. Additionally, if the court finds that the Maine House’s actions were particularly egregious, it could award other forms of relief, such as nominal damages, to recognize the violation of constitutional rights.
Likelihood of Being Granted
If Rep. Libby prevails in any of her core claims, she will likely recover attorney’s fees, as courts regularly award them in cases involving constitutional rights violations. However, whether additional financial damages would be granted is less clear, as courts are generally reluctant to award damages in legislative disputes unless there is clear evidence of personal harm beyond the constitutional violation itself.
Broader Implications: The Fight for Representative Democracy
The relief sought in this lawsuit concerns more than just Rep. Libby’s rights—it is about ensuring that elected officials remain accountable to the voters who elect them, not legislative leadership. The outcome of this case could set a powerful precedent in Maine and beyond, reaffirming that legislative bodies cannot arbitrarily silence dissenting voices or impose punitive measures that effectively nullify the will of the voters.
As this legal battle continues to unfold, we will monitor how the court responds to these requests for relief. In our fifth and final installment of this series, we will summarize the previous posts and discuss the overall likelihood that Rep. Libby’s lawsuit succeeds.