In the first two installments of this series, we explored the background and political context surrounding Rep. Laurel Libby’s censure, as well as the legal claims she has brought forward under both the U.S. and Maine Constitutions. Now, we turn to the broader implications of this case: the legal rights of Libby’s constituents, six of whom are co-plaintiffs in her lawsuit. If the censure against Rep. Libby is allowed to stand, it not only punishes Rep. Libby, but it also fundamentally disenfranchises the people who elected her to represent them.
The Indirect Harm to Voters: Representation Rights Violated
Even if the Maine House of Representatives had the legal authority to censure and silence Rep. Libby in this unprecedented way, it cannot—under either the U.S. Constitution or the Maine Constitution—strip her constituents of their right to legislative representation. The voters in her district are entitled to have their chosen representative speak and vote on their behalf. This action effectively nullifies the results of a democratic election, raising serious constitutional concerns.
Substantive Due Process: The Right to Vote and Have It Counted
The removal of Rep. Libby’s ability to participate in legislative debate and voting raises serious substantive due process claims. While procedural due process violations were at the heart of Rep. Libby’s legal claims, the claims of her constituents are better understood as substantive due process violations. These claims assert that the conclusion itself of the legislative process—in this case, the indefinite suspension of Libby’s legislative powers—results in the unconstitutional denial of fundamental rights.
Substantive due process claims frequently deal with cases where fundamental constitutional rights are being violated regardless of the exact procedures being applied. Sometimes these rights are the rights of families not to attend public schools, Pierce v. Society of Sisters (1925), meanwhile sometimes they concern cities trying to restrict certain families from living in certain parts of the city, such as in Moore v. City of East Cleveland (1977).
Substantive due process claims have also previously been applied by courts to the right of citizens to vote and have their votes counted. As Libby’s filing states:
“Electors have a ‘right … to vote and to have their votes counted.’ Marks v. Stinson, 19 F.3d 873, 889 (3d Cir. 1994). Thus, ‘rejection of a ballot where the voter has been effectively deprived of the ability to cast a legal vote implicates federal due process concerns.’ Id. Due process is denied where ‘the election process itself reaches the point of patent and fundamental unfairness.’ Griffin v. Burns, 570 F.2d 1065, 1077 (1st Cir. 1978).”
In this case, the censure process has functioned as a de facto removal, disenfranchising every voter in Libby’s district. This is fundamentally unfair and contradicts state and federal constitutional protections.
Equal Protection Clause: A Violation of ‘One Person, One Vote’
Beyond due process, the censure also implicates the Equal Protection Clause of the 14th Amendment. The Supreme Court has consistently upheld the principle that all qualified citizens have an equal right to vote and to have their votes counted equally. Reynolds v. Sims (1964) established the doctrine of “one person, one vote,” emphasizing that any restriction on this principle “strike[s] at the heart of representative government.”
By barring Rep. Libby from participating in the legislative process, the Maine House has effectively diminished the representation of Auburn’s voters compared to other districts. As established in Bush v. Gore (2000), equal protection applies not only to “the initial allocation of the franchise” but also to “the manner of its exercise.” If some districts retain full representation while others are stripped of their ability to have their legislator vote, the state has violated the Equal Protection Clause.
Notable legal precedents supporting this claim include:
- Kramer v. Union Free School District (1969), ruled that denying some residents the ability to vote based on arbitrary distinctions, such as having children or owning property, violated equal protection rights.
- Reynolds v. Sims (1964) reaffirmed, “The right to vote freely for the candidate of one’s choice is of the essence of a democratic society, and any restrictions on that right strike at the heart of representative government. And the right of suffrage can be denied by a debasement or dilution of the weight of a citizen’s vote just as effectively as by wholly prohibiting the free exercise of the franchise.”
The Guarantee Clause: Ensuring a Republican Form of Government
Another potential claim arises under the Guarantee Clause of Article IV, Section 4 of the U.S. Constitution, which ensures that each state maintains a “Republican Form of Government.” This does not refer to political parties but to a representative government where citizens elect officials who legislate on their behalf.
As the Supreme Court noted in Duncan v. McCall (1891), the defining feature of a republican government is “the right of the people to choose their own officers for governmental administration, and pass their own laws in virtue of the legislative power reposed in representative bodies.” By denying the people of Auburn their chosen representative’s voice and vote, the Maine House has arguably violated this constitutional requirement.
A Possible Remedy: Special Election Provisions
Suppose the Maine House insists on maintaining Rep. Libby’s indefinite silencing. In that case, it raises another critical question: should the district be allowed to hold a special election to replace or reelect her? Maine law provides for special elections when legislators cannot fulfill their duties due to resignation, death, or disqualification. However, in this case, Libby has not resigned or been expelled under the proper constitutional procedure. Does the law disqualify her? After all, Speaker Fecteau has taken it upon himself to indefinitely remove her ability to function as a member of the Legislature, implying that he sees her as no longer qualified to hold office.
This is not to say that Rep. Libby should resign or that she should not continue to represent her district to the best of her ability. Instead, I emphasize the legal twilight zone that Speaker Fecteau has placed House District 90 in: they are unable to have any voice in the House of Representatives of Maine and unable to cure this injury through any mechanism besides suing the Speaker in court. If a court rules that this is not the right avenue for them to regain their constitutional rights, the next question would be: what other options are there for House District 90?
Conclusion
The unprecedented punishment imposed on Rep. Laurel Libby is not merely a personal issue—it is an attack on the fundamental rights of her constituents. The voters of Auburn elected her to serve as their voice in Augusta, yet the Maine House of Representatives has unilaterally stripped them of that representation.
By doing so, they have violated substantive due process, the Equal Protection Clause, and possibly even the Guarantee Clause of the U.S. Constitution. This case is about more than one legislator—it is about the right of every Mainer to choose their representatives and have their votes count. If such actions are allowed to stand, what is to prevent future legislative majorities from silencing oppositional voices and nullifying the will of the people of Maine?
The courts must intervene to restore the constitutional order and ensure that every Maine voter retains their most fundamental right to be represented in their government. In the next blog post, I will discuss the relief that Rep. Libby and her constituents request from the court and how likely they are to get each requested relief.